Interest and Principal: A Failure of Definition in the Internal Revenue Code by unknown
INTEREST AND PRINCIPAL: A FAILURE OF DEFINITION
IN THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
THE Internal Revenue Code provides that interest, consideration for the use
of money, is taxable as income to the recipient' and is deductible by the debtor
when "paid or accrued."'2 It does not provide, however, any criteria for deter-
mining whether a partial payment on an interest bearing debt is principal or
interest. As a result, in determining when taxable income is realized, federal
courts have applied local principles of contract law 3 which allow the parties
to determine whether a payment is principal or interest.4 In Robcrt H. Gries,6
for example, the Tax Court gave effect to a private agreement, enforceable
under state law, that $14,000 paid on a debt consisting of $46,000 principal
and $27,000 interest was principal and consequently not taxable as income.0
Similarly, courts have given effect to bookkeeping entries where both parties
recorded the payment on the debt as principal, 7 and have upheld an agreement
to treat a payment as interest and therefore deductible, even though no accrued
interest was due at the time.8 Thus, since a taxpayer's characterization of debt
repayment as principal or interest is given effect, the parties are able to allocate
income or deductions to years in which they choose to call any given payment
principal or interest. Such taxpayers, accordingly, are able to exercise an tin-
usual degree of control over their income tax liability, notwithstanding the well
established principle that a taxpayer's earnings must "clearly reflect income"
in a meaningful economic sense 0 and that income cannot be avoided by antici-
patory arrangements or contracts whose only function is to designate the year
in which income is to be received or deductions to be taken.10 Since the present
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a).
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163.
3. See, e.g., Estate of Paul M. Bowen, 2 T.C. 1, 7-8 (1943) (dictum); Robert 1.
Gries, 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 383 (1950); cf. W. H. Hughes, 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 704,
709 (1952).
4. Thus, where a creditor accepts a payment subject to the debtor's direction that It be
applied to principal or to interest, such direction may be given effect, Xann v. Kann, 259
Pa. 583 (1918) ; Pindall v. Marietta Bank, 37 Val. 481 (Ohio 1839). And in the absence
of direction or agreement as to how a payment is to be applied, the payment must generally
be applied first to interest. Story v. Livingston, 38 U.S. 359, 370-75 (1839) ; Cf. Wallace
v. Glaser, 82 Mich. 190, 191 (1890). However, a creditor has been permitted to apply it as
he chooses. Bensor v. Reinshagen, 75 N.J. Eq. 358 (1909).
5. 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 383 (1950).
6. Id. at 384-85 (figures are rounded).
7. Robert Hughes & Co., 8 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 171 (1939), rev'd on other gronis,
109 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1940) ; George S. Groves, 38 B.T.A. 727 (1938).
8. I.T. 3740, 1945-2 Cum. BULL. 109; John D. Fackler, 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939).
9. See Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 188-90 (1957); American
Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
10. Cf. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), holding that taxpayer may not escape tax
by such arrangements; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), stating that "[arrange.
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treatment with regard to debt repayments presents the possibility of unwar-
ranted tax minimization,11 use of objective criteria for distinguishing interest
from principal, and thus more dearly reflecting income, seems desirable.
Recognition of the parties' designation of a payment as principal or interest,
under contract law, was established in cases which were unconcerned with the
question whether a payment represented a return of capital or the realization
of income. Rather, since characterization of particular payments as principal or
interest may affect the amount ultimately required to liquidate the debt, the
distinction between principal or interest in these cases was solely for the pur-
pose of determining whether the debt had been fully repaid.'' Moreover, as the
resolution of this issue-which could only arise where a debt bore simple in-
terest 13-depended on the parties' characterization of the nature of payments,
the courts naturally allowed the intent of the parties to prevail.
It seems dear, however, that what is recognized as a payment of interest
under state law does not correspond, except fortuitously, with what would nor-
mally be considered income under the Internal Revenue Code, and that what
is recognized as return of principal under state law does not correspond with
what would generally be considered a tax free return of capital. The distinc-
tion between principal and interest in tax law is merely a special instance of
the distinction between a return of capital and income. In distinguishing be-
tween a return of capital and income in other situations, courts have held that
any payment received in a profitable transaction, regardless of the taxpayer's
merts], though valid under state law, are not conclusive so far as § 22(a) [predecessor of
§ 61(a)] is concerned." Id. at 335.
11. Thus, the parties could agree to treat payments as principal in the early years of
repayment if the creditor's tax bracket were higher than the debtor's, perhaps dividing the
tax saving, and vice versa. Or, where the parties' income varied from year to year, they
could agree to treat payments as interest in years when the creditor's income .as relative-
ly low and the debtor's relatively high.
12. See, e.g., Story v. Livingston, 38 U.S. 359 (1839); Wallace v. Glaser, 82 Mich.
190 (1890) ; Pindall v. Marietta Bank, 37 Val. 481 (Ohio 1839) ; Kann v. Kann, 259 Pa.
583 (1918).
13. Interest may be simple or compound. Simple interest is computed solely ort prin-
cipal unpaid at the interest date; compound interest is computed on both unpaid principal
and unpaid interest, accrued in prior periods. When a debt bears simple interest, the total
amount to be paid in liquidating the debt will be less if principal is paid off first than if
each payment is applied first to interest then due. For instance if $I000 is loaned at 10%
simple interest, and after the first year a $500 payment is made which is applied to prin-
cipal, then the payment required to liquidate the debt one year later will be $650 ($500
principal + $100 interest accrued in first year + $50 interest accrued in second year). But
if the first payment is applied first to interest to the extent possible, $660 will be required
($600 principal + $60 interest accrued in second year). Thus, litigation to determine
whether a $650 payment by the debtor has liquidated the debt depends on whether, accord-
ing to the loan agreement, the first payment is required to be applied to principal or to
interest.
Only where the debt bears simple interest, however, is this true. If compound interest
were specified, the second payment would be $660 in either case. If the first payment were
applied to principal, $10 of interest would accrue on the $100 interest that remained un-
paid in. the first year.
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designation, must be allocated between income and capital.1 4 Thus, a taxpayer
is not allowed to recover his entire capital investment before some income is
deemed to have been received. It would seem that similar requirements would
apply to payments of principal and interest. Under current tax practice, how-
ever, the parties to a loan agreement can determine, for any given repayment
schedule, the years in which income is to be received. For example, if it has been
determined that a $1000 loan is to be repaid with two $600 payments to be
made one and two years after the date of the loan, the entire $200 of income
will be taxable in the second year if the loan agreement provides for 14.3 per
cent simple interest and requires that the payments be applied first to principal.
But if the agreement provides for 13.1 per cent interest and requires that pay-
ments be applied first to accrued interest, then $131 of income will be taxable
in the first year and $69 will be taxable in the second even though the repay-
ment schedule-requiring two $600 payments-is identical. In this way the
judicious characterization of payments as principal or interest in the loan agree-
ment may be used to minimize tax liability by allocating a given amount of
income to years in which the creditor is in a relatively low tax bracket or the
debtor is in a relatively high one.
It would seem, therefore, that state law, which allows the parties to choose
their own terminology for the purpose of setting the amount of their loan,
should not be determinative of tax liability. Most Code provisions are not to
be taken as subject to state control or limitations unless the language or neces-
sary implication of the section involved makes its application dependent on
state law,15 and it is unlikely that Congress intended that state contract law
govern the interest provisions of the Code, knowing that the parties could, as a
consequence, fully control the extent to which any payment is taxable. Allow-
ing the parties to determine what is principal or interest, moreover, seems con-
trary to the courts' solution in other analogous situations. For instance, in de-
ciding whether an out-lay is an ordinary and necessary business expense rather
than a capital expenditure,'0 courts look to Treasury Regulations 17 and judicial
precedents,' 8 both of which furnish objective criteria that is not dependent upon
state law or the taxpayer's intention.' 9 Because there is seldom any non-tax
14. Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 275-76 (1938) (and cases cited at 275 n.3) ; cl.
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6 (1957).
15. United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 402-05 (1941).
16. An ordinary and necessary business expense is deductible under the Code, whereas
a capital expenditure is not. See IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) ; see generally Cook,
Repairs Expense Vermis Capital Expenditures, 13 TAx L. REV. 231 (1958).
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1958).
18. Cf. Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 635 (1950).
19. Thus repairs are for the purpose of keeping property in good operating condition.
See, e.g., Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 635, (1950); American
Bemberg Corp., 10 T.C. 361 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1949). Capital improve.
ments, on the other hand, extend the life of the property, Illinois Merchants Trust Co,, 4
B.T.A. 103 (1926), restore depreciated property, P. Dougherty Co., 5 T.C. 791 (1945),
aff'd, 159 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 838 (1947), materially add to
value, Hotel Sulgrave, Inc., 21 T.C. 619 (1954), or are part of a general scheme of recon-
[Vol. 72: 200
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reason for taxpayers to distinguish between a capital expenditure and business
expense,2° giving effect to the parties' self-determination in this situation would
create a patent tax avoidance device.21 Similarly, numerous other characteriza-
tions of the taxpayer, especially those having no non-tax effects, are scrutinized
and often rejected because they do not dearly reflect income. 22
But if courts are not to follow state law and, thus, the agreement of the
parties-because they do not purport to allocate economic income-then an
alternative method must be adopted for determining when or what part of a
payment should be taxed or deducted as interest. Since the object of such a
determination is to reflect income clearly, it seems appropriate to use an objec-
tive technique that is not dependent on the wishes of the parties or on income
tax considerations. Such a technique is available and is widely used, albeit for
another purpose, by professional investors in appraising the merits of various
alternative investment opportunities. Such investors assess various investments
by determining and comparing the predicted yield or rate of return on each
investment.m
Yield or rate of return is the uniform, annually compounded interest rate
which the invested sum must earn to account fully both for any interest or
dividends paid and also for any increase in the capital value of the invest-
ment.24 When such rate of return is multiplied by the total value of an invest-
ditioning, Joseph Merrick Jones, 24 T.C. 563 (1955), aff'd, 242 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1957).
See generally Cook, .upra note 16. In borderline cases, however, a taxpayer's consistent
accounting method may be giver some weight Cf. IV. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26
B.T.A. 1192 (1932), appeal dimnzissed, 68 F.2d 1022 (6th Cir. 1934).
20. The evident significance to taxpayers of the capital or expense alternatives is in
fact that if an item is expensed, the related tax money is available as current work-
ing capital On the other hand, if the item is capitalized, the expenditure tax-wise is
generally recoverable through depreciation over a period of years, with a correspond-
ing loss of interest value on related tax money.
Cook, supra note 16, at 232.
However, there are times when. non-tax considerations may be significant, as for in-
stance, if the parties had agreed to buy and sell a business for a price related to its book
value.
21. Le., many taxpayers would treat all expenditures as deductible repairs rather than
capital improvements, if such treatment would be recognized for tax purposes.
22. Thus the taxpayer's pro rata allocation of membership dues in monthly amounts
was found to be purely artificial and ineffective for tax purposes, Automobile Club of
Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); arrangements that serve no business
purpose will be ignored, Aldon Homes v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 582 (1959) ; Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940) ; see also Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940) in which
the Supreme Court refused to apply local law in determining whether a conveyance created
a taxable reversionary interest:
Such an essay in linguistic refinement would still further embarrass existing in-
tricacies. It might demonstrate verbal ingenuity, but it could hardly strengthen the
rational foundations of law.
Id. at 117.
23. See generally JoRDAN & DOUGAU., IN VSTusns 271-88 (6th ed. 1952).
24. Compare definition of "net yield," JoRDAw & DOUGALL, op. cit. .upra note 23, at
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ment-the amount originally invested plus accrued earnings-at the beginning
of a tax year, the product is the portion of the total income to be realized from
the investment which is allocable to that tax year. And, although it is possible
to allocate income on the assumption that the rate at which the investment pro-
duces income varies, even to the extent that all the income from a long term
investment could be considered to be earned in a single year, the assumption
made by professional investors of a constant rate of return seems far more
reasonable. Thus the problem of allocating income requires a determination of
the rate of return to be realized by the creditor from his loan. In the case of
indebtedness bearing compound interest, the nominal interest rate and the rate
of return are identical. Where, however, indebtedness bears simple interest,
or the parties, without stipulating an interest rate, agree to liquidate indebted-
ness by means of payments to be made in specified amounts at designated
times, determination of the equivalent interest rate can be simply accomplished
by reference to readily available compound interest tables.
25
Such calculations thus provide an alternative to giving effect to the parties'
characterization in determining when a payment on indebtedness constitutes
interest. Under this alternative the rate of return would first be ascertained
and would then be considered to be the interest rate on the indebtedness. An
accrual basis taxpayer would accrue interest in conformity with this construc-
tive compound interest rate; a cash basis taxpayer would treat any payment
"in cash or its equivalent" as interest to the extent that interest, calculated in
accordance with the constructive compound interest rate, has accrued but has
not previously been treated as paid. Recognition of interest, as income or ex-
pense, would thus be restricted to the years to which income or expense is
economically allocable and in which payments are actually made in the case of
a cash basis taxpayer; it would, furthermore, insure that accrual basis tax-
payers cannot, by agreeing to call a payment principal, avoid tax recognition
in years in which income or expense is economically accrued. It should be
noted, however, that since the amounts of various payments required under the
loan agreement must be calculated on the basis of the interest rate stipulated
in the agreement, separate accounts may be necessary for tax and non-tax pur-
poses. The two accounts would show different amounts of principal, interest,
and total amounts owing at any time except that, of course, both would agree
as to the point at which the debt was fully repaid. 20
25. See, e.g., RIDER, THE MATHEmATICS OF INVESTMENT 127-48 (1938); Gitmwr,
PRINCIPLES OF ENGINEERING ECONOmY 597-613 (3d ed. 1950). For example if $1000 is
loaned at 7% simple interest for 10 years, principal and accrued interest to be paid in the
tenth year, the amount to be repaid at that time will be $1,700. By interpolation from tables
in RIDER at 130-31, or in GRANT at 607-08, the equivalent annual compound interest rate is
5.45%.
26. The nature of the two accounts will be made clearer by the following example.
Assume that $1000 is loaned at 7% simple interest on the understanding that $600 will be
paid in one year and credited to principal, the remaining principal and interest to be repaid
at the end of the following year. The constructive compound interest rate is 6.681%, tables
in RIDER, GRANT, op. cit. supra note 25. Prior to the $600 payment the tax account would
[Vol. 72:200
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The suggested method of ascertaining when interest is paid or accrued must
be modified in a few special cases. For instance, if the repayment schedule
cannot be determined because the parties agreed that the debt should be liqui-
dated at an undetermined future date, then a constructive compound interest
rate cannot be computed.27 In this situation, it would seem that each payment
should be treated as part return of principal and part interest in proportion to
the ratio of the amount of the loan to the total amount of income to be earned.e
Similarly, when a debt bears simple interest but the time of repayment is not
known, a constructive compound interest rate cannot be determined.^ In this
case it seems that to determine what part of a payment constitutes interest for
tax purposes, each payment should be treated as applied first to any accrued
simple interest which has not been previously treated as paid, even though the
parties may agree to apply the payment to principal for the purpose of deter-
mining the amount of future payments.30
The suggested treatment is not the equivalent of putting a cash basis tax-
payer on an accrual basis as to interest, since no amount is taxed as interest
unless an actual payment is received; moreover, this treatment preserves the
parties' right under contract law to characterize any payment as principal for
the purpose of reducing the base for computing future interest. However, such
a treatment of partial payments on indebtedness, by using the concepts of rate
of return and constructive compound interest rates to allocate interest income,
deprives a taxpayer of one justifiable advantage he now holds under the present
practice of following state law. Where a taxpayer has reason to believe a loan
show $1066.81 owing ($1000 principal and $66.81 interest); the non-tax account would
show $1070 owing ($1000 principal and $70 interest). Since the $600 would be applied in
part to interest for tax purposes, but entirely to principal according to the loan agreement,
the tax account after that payment would show $466.81 owing (all principal), and the non-
tax account would show $470 owing ($400 principal and 70 interest). Immediately prior
to the second payment, the tax account would show $498 owing ($466.81 principal and
$31.19 interest) ; and the non-tax account would show $498 owing ($400 principal and 93
interest-$70 accrued in the first year and $28 accrued in the second year). On payment
of $498 both accounts will show the debt to be fully repaid.
27. The constructive compound interest rate can be determined only where the sum
to be repaid and time of repayment are known, except that only one of these two variables
is needed if a simple interest rate is also known.
28. Such a method of allocating a receipt to return of capital and income is common in
recognizing gains realized on the sale or exchange of a portion of a capital asset. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a), Example (1); Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271 (1938) (and cases
cited at 275 n.3).
29. Since without the time of repayment the sum to be repaid cannot be known, the
requirements described in note 27 mipra cannot be met.
30. Thus, if $1000 is loaned at 7% simple interest on the understanding that all pay-
ments will be applied first to principal, $50 is in fact paid in the first year, and $100 is in
fact paid in the second year, $50 will be taxed as interest in the first year (since Q70 in-
terest had accrued, the entire payment will be treated as interest), and $86.50 will be taxed
as interest in the second year ($20 interest accrued in th first year but not previously
treated as paid plus $66.50 interest accrued on $950 principal-the first payment having
been applied to principal for the purpose of calculating the amount still due).
1962]
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may not be repaid in full, he may choose to apply all payments first to principal
to avoid declaring taxable income on what may ultimately be a losing trans-
action.3 ' Although this privilege will be lost if the suggested treatment is
adopted, the uncertain creditor can still avoid declaring income by making a
binding waiver of his right to interest. A broader privilege seems incongruous
since, in the similar case of bonds, all interest must be declared as income
even where the bond appears incapable of being redeemed 3 2 and even though
no loss would be allowed until the bond became totally worthless.13
31. Thus, in Robert H. Gries, 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 383 (1950), the creditor, apparent-
ly fearing that his loan would never be repaid in full, agreed with the debtor that pay-
ments would be applied first to principal. The Tax Court held that the payments did not
constitute income.
32. Herbert Payson, Jr., 18 TCM 686, 689 (1959).
33. If any security which is a capital asset becomes worthless during the taxable year,
the loss resulting therefrom shall... be treated as a loss from the sale or exchange
... of a capital asset.
INT. Rnv. CODF OF 1954 § 165(g). See also Merrill Trust Co., 21 B.T.A. 1395 (1931).
